


The International Conference on the Territory and Maritime Issues

Sovereignty over Dokdo from Historical, Political, and Cultural Perspectives



Co-organized by

Korean-American University Professors Association (KAUPA)
Northeast Asian History Foundation (NAHF)

and Supported by

The University of Rhode Island (URI)

Friday June 5, 2015

6:00pm - 8:00pm

Reception and Welcoming Dinner (Rm: South County)

Saturday June 6, 2015

8:00am - 9:00pm

Conference (Rm: Bristol)

Omni Providence Hotel

1 West Exchange Street

Providence, RI 02903

Program

8:00 – 9:00 REGISTRATION AND BREAKFAST

9:00 – 9:30 **OPENING CEREMONY**

Hosts: **Harlan M. Doliner**, Adj. Professor, Roger Williams University Law School
Ki-Hyon Kinney Kim, Prof. of Physics, North Carolina Central University

Introduction:

K. Wayne Lee, President of Korean-American University Professors Association (KAUPA)
and Professor of Civil and Environmental Engineering, The University of Rhode Island (URI)

Welcoming Remarks:

Raymond M. Wright, Dean of Engineering, URI
Song Jun Ohm, Consul General of the Republic of Korea in Boston
Euy-Sang Yoo, Ambassador for Geographic Naming, Northeast Asian History
Foundation (NAHF)

9:30 – 10:15 **KEYNOTE SPEECH**

James Kraska, Professor of Ocean Law and Policy, Stockton Center for the Study of
International Law, U.S. Naval War College

“The International Law of Territorial and Maritime Disputes in East Asia”

10:15 – 10:30 PHOTO SESSION & COFFEE BREAK

10:30 – 12:30 **SESSION 1: SOVEREIGNTY OVER DOKDO**

Chair : **Jonathan M. Guttoff** (Prof. of Law, Roger Williams University)

1. **Terence Roehrig** (Prof. of National Security Affairs, U.S. Naval War College) **“Dokdo, Takeshima, or Liancourt Rocks: The United States and the Korea/Japan Island Issue”**
 2. **Jino Kwak** (Research Fellow, NAHF) **“Japan’s Claim over Dokdo and its Limits; Through Records”**
 3. **Sung-Yoon Lee** (Kim Koo-Korea Foundation Professor of Korean Studies and Assistant Professor at The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University) **“Delimiting United Korea’s Borders: Leverage Japan’s Strategic Interests in the Korea Peninsula”**
 4. **Suk Kyoong Kim** (ROKCG Ret. and Visiting Scholar in Residence at the Stockton Center for the Study of International Law) **“Maritime Disputes in Northeast Asia”**
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Discussants:

Andy Norris (Prof. of Maritime Security, U.S. Naval War College)
Hai-Ung Jung (Former Ambassador, Legal Advisor to Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Republic of Korea)
Jieun Park (Doctoral Student of Political Science, Georgia State University)

12:30 – 14:00 LUNCH BREAK

14:00 – 15:50 **SESSION 2: HISTORICAL, POLITICAL, AND CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES**

Chair : **Myung Jong Lee** (Prof. of Computer Eng, NY City Univ.)

1. **Edward Kwon** (Prof. of political Science, Northern Kentucky Univ.) **“Shinzo Abe’s Flimsy Scheme of Territorial Claim over Korea’s Dokdo Islets”**
 2. **Jongnam Choi** (Prof. of Geography, Western Illinois University) **“An Introduction of Dokdo Lesson Plans for American Students”**
 3. **Stephen (Jumyong) Lee** and **Jichul Jang** (Prof. of Hospitality Management, Kansas State University) **“The Potential of Dokdo and East Sea as a Tourism Destination”**
 4. **Seoung-Keun Hong** (Director of Dokdo Research Institute, NAHF) **“The Dokdo Issue between Korea and Japan, and the position of the United States in 1950s”**
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Discussants:

Harlan M. Doliner (Adj. Prof. of Maritime Law, Roger Williams University Law School)

Sunwoong Kim (Prof. of Economics, U of Wisconsin at Milwaukee)

15:50 – 16:10 COFFEE BREAK

16:10 – 18:00 **ROUND TABLE: DISCUSSION ON RESOLUTIONS**

Moderator: **Nakho Sung** (Prof. of Chemical Eng., Tufts University)

Panel: **Mark Selden** (Senior Research Associate, Cornell University)

Paul Huth (Prof. of Political Science, U of Maryland and the Editor of the Journal of Conflict Resolution)

Uk Heo (Distinguished Prof. of Political Science, UW-Milwaukee)

Young B. Choi (Prof. of Information Systems Technology, Regent University)

Thomas Oh (Prof. of Information Sciences, Rochester Inst of Tech)

Hai-Ung Jung (Former Ambassador, Legal Advisor to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Korea)

Terence Roehrig (Prof. of National Security Affairs, U.S. Naval War College)

Keun-Gwan Lee (Professor, School of Law, Seoul National University)

Cheol Young Choi (Professor, College of Law, Daegu University)

18:00 – 18:15 CLOSING REMARKS : **K. Wayne Lee**, KAUPA President

Recess

19:00 – 21:00 **BANQUET**

Hosted by: Honorable Consul General **Song Jun Ohm**

Solo and/or Duet by KAUPA Music Committee (Prof. **In Dal Choi**, Prof. **Youngsuk Kim**, Dr. **Woonjung Kim** and Prof. **Ryu-Kyung Kim**)

Abstracts of Presentations

“Dokdo, Takeshima, or the Liancourt Rocks: The United States and the Korea/ Japan Island Issue”

Terence Roehrig (National Security Affairs, U.S. Naval War College)

Abstract

South Korea and Japan have had a long simmering dispute over a group of islands South Korea calls Dokdo and Japan, Takeshima. As its two most important allies in Asia, Washington has often been caught in the middle of a dispute that has helped make cooperation difficult between these partners. U.S. policy over the last several decades has been clear – the U.S. government does not take a position on the sovereignty of the islands; this is an issue that Seoul and Tokyo must resolve diplomatically, and the United States will accept whatever decision is reached between its two allies. Indeed, the United States does not refer to the islands as Dokdo or Takeshima using instead the name of Liancourt Rocks, the international label for the islands named after a French whaling ship that came close to crashing into the rocks in 1849. The United States should continue this position, quietly prod South Korea and Japan to reach some type of accommodation but devote most of its effort to helping both sides manage the conflict in ways that do not damage the alliances and further trilateral cooperation in politics, security, and economics.

“Japan's Claim over Dokdo and its Limits; Through Records”

Jino Kwak (Research Fellow, Northeast Asian History Foundation)

Abstract

It is not difficult to see research contents change over time. It is difficult to know if a change is a headed to progress, but research on Dokdo is changing over time for sure. This kind of change happens when a new historical data is found or when the international power structure is changed. After the war, Japan has been claiming rights over Dokdo. Japan's policy toward Korea in the Cold War period was mostly through official documents from the foreign affairs ministry, but now it comes from textbooks, media, and government. As seen, in the past, Japan's claim over Dokdo was an important part of its diplomacy, but now it is regarded as a national political issue. Therefore, this study aims to Japan's claim over Dokdo and its limits through records. Further, this research suggests possible solutions.

“Delimiting United Korea's Borders: Leverage Japan's Strategic Interests in the Korea Peninsula”

Sung-Yoon Lee (The Fletcher School, Tufts University)

Abstract

In the Korean War, the U.S. sought assistance not only from the fifteen nations that came to South Korea under the UN imprimatur but also America's most natural source of men and materiel in the region, Japan. The U.S. employed thousands of Japanese nationals, to a limited extent, in combat duties in and around the Korean peninsula, including dozens of Japanese minesweeping vessels in the Korean waters and harbors of Wonsan, Kunsan, Incheon, Haeju, and Nampo. Likewise, in any future contingency operations in the Korean peninsula, Japan's naval assets will most likely come to play important roles in humanitarian aid and disaster relief operations as well as interdiction of North Korean vessels at sea.

Beyond the economic and strategic imperatives of proactive participation in military and humanitarian operations in the Korean peninsula, Japan also has a strong diplomatic incentive to make positive contributions in a contingency situation despite widespread Korean skepticism about Tokyo's intentions. In the event of Korean unification, the new nation with its official seat of government in Seoul will remain pro-U.S., but also of necessity, pro-China. Seoul's need for capital investment from these two big nations will ensure a benign

policy toward Washington and Beijing. On the other hand, even as Japan will be well positioned to exercise its decades-old experience as the world's biggest donor of official development aid as a generous partner in the great Korean reconstruction effort, the political relationship between a revamped Seoul and Tokyo is not guaranteed to be cordial, that is, compared with Seoul's political relations with Beijing. Here's an opportunity for Seoul to start calling on Japan to relinquish its claim on Dokdo and stop its willful history-laundering.

In the past, Seoul has announced that it would pursue a policy of equidistance between Washington, its sole military ally and biggest patron, and Beijing, Pyongyang's sole ally and its biggest patron state. If South Korea, with a population of not-quite 50 million, can officially declare a policy of equidistance between the U.S. and China, a United Korea in the future, with a population of approximately 80 million, may certainly be assumed to entertain practicing a policy of "discriminatory equidistance" between Beijing and Tokyo.

For Japan today, the inauspicious specter of losing Seoul to China's orbit is mitigated by the fact that South Korea, no matter how anti-Japan it may be, has a compelling need to remain under the U.S. security umbrella in the face of an ever-threatening North Korea. But with North Korea removed from the geopolitical arena, United Korea may be more prone to igniting its atavistic anti-Japanese sentiment. A United Korea that values China more than Japan and is prone to revive historical grudges against Japan potentially has serious political, strategic, and economic implications for both Japan and the U.S. If only to dampen such Korean nationalistic impulses from manifestation in a bigger, stronger Korea, Japan—with exhortation from the U.S.—will likely compromise on non-vital strategic issues vis-à-vis Korea, namely, its claim on Dokdo and propensity to whitewash history. It behooves Seoul to exploit that prospective change in the regional balance of power in its favor by starting a dialogue with Tokyo in support of Japan's limited military operations in and around the Korean peninsula in the event of a sudden change in the status quo in North Korea on the condition of Japan's irreversible renouncement of any territorial claim on Dokdo as well as unequivocal statement of culpability and contrition for past war crimes against Korea.

"Maritime Disputes in Northeast Asia"

Suk Kyoon Kim

(ROKCG Ret. and Visiting Scholar in Residence at the Stockton Center for the Study of International Law)

Abstract

Maritime disputes pose a great threat to stability and peace in Northeast Asia, where the region is integrating economically. There are a great number of unsolved maritime issues, on topics such as maritime boundary delimitation, territorial disputes, marine energy resources, fisheries and security.

Many of the maritime disputes in Northeast Asia are deeply rooted in the colonial history of the region. Some are attributed to disparities in the interpretation of the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. Above all, maritime interests at stake are so essential to the regional countries concerned. The reshaping of international relations in the region in the post-Cold War period, represented by the rise of China to a global power and U.S. intervention, with a pivot to Asia, to contain China. The unique situation on the Korean Peninsula and the Taiwan Strait add complexity. Maritime issues are increasingly becoming a significant determinant of international politics in the region of Northeast Asia.

My presentation will explore issues and nature of maritime disputes in Northeast Asia and attempt to suggest some solutions to such maritime disputes.

"Shinzo Abe's Flimsy Scheme of Territorial Claim over Korea's Dokdo Islets"

Edward Kwon (Prof. of political Science, Northern Kentucky Univ.)

Abstract

This paper would like to shed light on a series of the current Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's flimsy scheme of territorial claim over Korean sovereign territory of the Dokdo islets. As many scholars and the general public had early expected, the current Japan Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has been pushing its ultra-nationalistic policy agenda intending to boost domestic cohesiveness. Abe is reluctant to fully accept Kono's statement that "Japanese military was, directly or indirectly, involved in the establishment

and management of the comfort stations and the transfer of comfort women....in many cases they were recruited against their own will, through coaxing, coercion....” On December 26, 2013, Abe’s chauvinistic sense drove him to visit Yasukuni Shrine where 14 class A war criminals from World War II were buried. Furthermore, Abe’s intention to revise Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution has brought severe anxiety, reminding Asian neighbors of past Japanese imperialism. Abe announced that his government would allow the Self-Defense Forces to exercise “the right to collective self-defense” on May 15, 2014. Such a move was part of Abe’s strategy aiming to circumvent the democratic revision process of the Constitution by its government decision, pursuing a normal state vision in the near future. During Abe’s second tenure, particularly Abe himself, Fumio Kishida (Foreign Minister), and Eriko Yamatani (minister in charge of the issue regarding the abduction of Japanese nationals by North Korea) shared a strong tone of territorial sovereignty over the Dokdo islets.

Mr. Abe intentionally takes advantage of the wrongful territorial claim on Dokdo islets, appealing to the nationalistic public sense in order to boost his popularity. From the beginning of his recent tenure of prime minister, the Abe cabinet unreasonably demanded that the Dokdo Islands should belong to Japan, vowing to seek settlement by international law. Mr. Abe, for the first time in Japan history, installed the Territorial and Sovereign Issues Planning and Coordination Office, managing the Dokdo issue to the level of a governmental organization. He also for the first time sent a central government representative to the ceremony of Takeshima Day in 2013. The Abe cabinet approved new elementary school textbooks that include false information supporting Japan’s sovereignty over the Dokdo Islands. The new elementary textbooks of 2015 describe that Japan’s sovereign territory, the Takeshima islets, has been unlawfully occupied by South Korea. On April 7, 2015, Shinzo Abe cabinet repeated its wrongful claim on Dokdo in the 2015 Diplomatic Bluebook. According to the Bluebook, South Korea has effectively controlled Takeshima, Japanese territory, based on history and international law. Abe’s wrongful territorial claims over the Dokdo islets drive cooperative international relations between Korea and Japan into a disastrous situation reminding Korean public of atrocious colonial legacy of Japanese imperialism. Likewise, most right-wing Japanese politicians, the Abe cabinet raise their voice for the ownership over Dokdo islets in order to propagandize the issue as a cohesive symbol of nationalism. Abe’s dangerous revisionism and ultranationalist position has increased tension between Korea and Japan.

Regardless of solid historical foundation and legal evidences of Korean sovereignty over the Dokdo islets, why does the current Abe cabinet continue to push fictitious logic of erroneous territorial claim? Why does the Abe cabinet insist on claiming ownership of the islets in spite of self-evident sovereign ownership by Korea? Is the Abe cabinet exploiting the issue for political or economic gains? Can we figure out the hazy outline of Abe’s scheme of territorial claim on the Dokdo islets in his mindset? This paper would like to investigate these research questions based on the analysis on the current Abe cabinet’s flimsy scheme of territorial claim over the Dokdo islets.

“An Introduction of Dokdo Lesson Plans for American Students”

Jongnam Choi (Western Illinois University)

Abstract

In the United States, geographical education begins in elementary education and is nurtured steadily during the periods of secondary and post-secondary educations. Secondary geographical education provides students experiences that enable them to identify a geographical issue, to collect and examine evidence representing all aspects of the issue, to judge the reliability and validity of the evidence, to present their position on the issue through discussion, and to take appropriate actions. Through these activities, geography education teaches students to serve as responsible citizens, with knowledge, values, and skills that complement and benefit our society and it further enables students to develop a reliable and accurate view of the global society.

Considering that the territorial conflict over Dokdo between Korea and Japan is a typical lesson topic in geographical education, American students can be appropriately engaged in the Dokdo issue through geography education, especially the Advanced Placement Human Geography curriculum. In order to inform American teachers and students the legitimacy of Korean occupation of Dokdo, a complete set of Dokdo lesson materials for the American secondary geography education was developed. In this conference, I will introduce a whole set of Dokdo lessons and a future plan to disseminate the lesson into high school geography and social study education.

“The Potential of Dokdo and East Sea as a Tourism Destination”

Jumyong (Stephen) Lee (Department of Hospitality Management & Dietetics, Kansas State University)
and **Jichul Jang** (Department of Hospitality Management & Dietetics, Kansas State University)

Abstract

Though Dokdo is one of Korea's most famous islands, it has many challenging issues as a tourist destination. First of all, tourists without a declaration of entry are not allowed to disembark at the island aside from the fact that they can stay on it for just 30 minutes. While it is better than before because it had been forbidden to travel to Dokdo due to political and security reasons and for the protection of its wildlife until opened to the public in 2005, it is still limited to access to the island for inclement weather conditions (e.g. the winter suspension of the ships) that lead to the limited number of visitable days (i.e. only about 55 days a year). Despite the fact that neighboring Ulleungdo (just only 87.4 kilometers away from Dokdo) attracts more people than before, the number of visitors permitted is restricted to 1,880 people per day in Dokdo. Without food and accommodations in Ulleungdo, tourists cannot even think about planning to travel to Dokdo because it has no restaurants or accommodation facilities. Furthermore, the visitors cannot go beyond Dong-do Port (the eastern island pier) once they arrive on Dokdo.

However, this island may be able to become an attractive tourism destination to have an economic impact on the local community. The county governor of Ulleungdo, Soo-il Choi declared the five strategic plans such as the second phase of Port Ulleung, construction of the around-the-Ulleung island road and an international airport, etc. Under the influence of disastrous Sewol accident, the number of visitors plummeted to 270,000 people (30% decrease in tourism) in 2014. So, the Ulleung government is planning to host familiarization trips for press and to provide incentives when people participate in the movement, entitled 'Stepping on Dokdo, Our Territory.' Moreover, Korean federal government is making considerable efforts on establishing the infrastructure to boost tourism industry of East Sea region. For example, KTX (Korean fast train) was extended to Pohang in March 2015, resulting in reduced travel time to the East coast drastically. As aforementioned, the airport in Ulleung (expected opening in 2020) will open the new phase of tourism in East Sea area. According to The Korea Transport Institute (KOTI), it estimates the increased number of visitors (approximately 800,000 people from 420,000 in 2014) that leads to the economic impact of 40 million USD to save the cost on the destination. Once the airport is built, it is expected that Ulleungdo will be able to one of the most popular destinations in Korea such as Jeju and it may have propaganda effect on announcing that Dokdo is our territory to the world. In conclusion, Dokdo and East Sea has a great potential to be a competitive tourist attraction.

“The Dokdo Issue between Korea and Japan, and the position of the United States in 1950s”

Seoung-Keun Hong (Director of Dokdo Research Institute, NAHF)

Abstract

This is the 70th year after the end of WWII and the 50th year after the normalization of diplomatic relation between Korea and Japan. However, Japan has been claiming the sovereignty over Dokdo more systematically and aggressively with the Planning & Coordination Office for Territory/Sovereignty Measures as the center installed in her cabinet in February 2013. This makes the friendly relationship of Korea and Japan distorted and interrupted. This paper examines two cases of Dokdo in 1952 when Dokdo became the first diplomatic issue between Korea and Japan. It helps us understand what situation the Dokdo Issue has brought out and how the conflict and confrontation between Korea and Japan surrounding the Dokdo has proceeded.

The cases of Dokdo in 1952 are Korea's Proclamation of Peace Line in January of 1952 and Japan's designation of bombing range of Dokdo in July of 1952.

In the official website of Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, there are Japan's nine claims of the sovereignty over Dokdo which include claims of Korea's Proclamation of Peace Line as her 8th claim and Japan's designation of bombing range of Dokdo as her 7th claim. The one is to claim that Korea unlawfully controls Dokdo. The other is to claim Dokdo as part of Japan. The Proclamation of Peace Line was made by Korea, however, the designation of bombing range of Dokdo was planned by Japan.

Two countries of Korea and Japan had severely debated over these two cases, and furthermore, in the courses of the debates, Korea and Japan tried to lead the U.S. to their sides.

This paper examines what policy on Dokdo was made by Korea and Japan, and what position the third country U.S. tried to stand on in 1950s. This examination provides understanding about the policies of Korea, Japan and the position of the third country U.S. in these corresponding issues of Dokdo.
